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QUANTIF ICAT IONAL LOGIC  
I. This is the first of three surveys of introductions to what  we  believe to be 
the three areas of modern  logic wh ich  are of most  direct interest to readers of 
this Journal. The  area to be covered in this paper is the study of what  is vari- 
ously called the first order predicate calculus or the first order predicate logic, 
the lower order predicate calculus or logic, the first order functional calculus or 
logic or s imply quantification theory or quantificational (or functional) logic, and  
somet imes  just mathemat ica l  logic. This s tudy includes as a part the study of 
the propositional or sentential calculus or logic. We will use "sentential logic" 
and  "quantifical logic." Later surveys will cover the study of the higher order 
predicate calculi (or logics), and  of set theory, and  the description and  study of 
effective processes (this includes such subjects as Recursive Funct ion  Theory ,  
Tur ing  Mach ines  and  Combinator ia l  Logic). 
The  books to be compared  here are the following: 
(1) In t roduct ion  to Mathemat ica l  Logic. By ALONZO CHURCH. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1956. 376 pp., $7.50. 
(2) Symbolic Logic. By IRVING M. CoPI. Macmillan, New York, 1954. 355 pp., 
$5.00. 
(3) Principles of Mathemat ica l  Logic, an unauthorized translation from 
the second German Edition of Grundzuge der Theoret ischen Logik, with 
ammendments and added notes. By D. HILBERT AND W. AC~ERMAN. Chelsea, New 
York, 1950. 172 pp., $3.75. 
(4) An In t roduct ion  to Deductive Logic. By HuGuEs LEBLANC. Wiley, 
New York, 1955. 244 pp., $5.25. 
(5) Mathemat ica l  Logic. By WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINL Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass., Revised Edition 1951. 346 pp., $5.25. 
(6) Methods of Logic. By WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE. Henry Holt, New 
York, Revised Edition 1959. 272 pp., $4.75. 
(7) In t roduct ion  to Logic. By PATRICK SUPPES. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 
N. J., Toronto, London, New York, 1957. 312 pp., $5.50. 
(8) In t roduct ion  to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sci- 
ences. By ALFRED TARSXI. Oxford University Press, New York. Second Revised 
Edition 1946. 239 pp., $3.75. 
2. The central problem of logic that has motivated much of its development 
from Aristotle's yllogisms down to the mathematical logic of the present day is: 
Given any sentences Q, P I ,  P~, " ' ,  state precisely under what circumstances 
the sentence Q is a logical consequence of the sentences P1, P2, • • • 
As the problem is now stated it is incapable of solution since one does not know 
what is meant by either "sentence," or "logical consequence." Actually what is 
meant by "state precisely" presents a difficulty also although one can put this 
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difficulty aside, at least temporari ly,  by allowing generally accepted standards of 
mathematical  exposition. 
Rather  than at tempt any definition of sentence in a natural  anguage it is much 
easier to define sentence in an artificial language. Furthermore,  if the artificial 
language is properly constructed then a solution of the central  problem of logic 
can be assisted. For if the translat ion of some of the sentences of a natural  an- 
guage into sentences of the artificial language is possible, and if a definition of 
"logical consequence" for sentences of the artificial language is provided, then a 
definition of "logical consequence" for those sentences of the natural  language 
that  can be translated is also provided. 
Quantif icational logic is the most widely useful of the artificial languages de- 
vised up till now and is the basis of other artificial languages, such as the higher 
order logics and set theory. Sentential  logic, which occurs as a proper part  of 
quantif icational logic, can be understood as presupposing certain atomic  sentences 
which are unanalyzable from the point of view of sentential  logic (but are ana- 
lyzable from the point of view of quantif icational logic). For example, one might 
consider sentences uch as "3 is pr ime," " there is an even prime number , "  or 
"all  odd numbers are pr ime" as atomic sentences of sentential  logic, l imit ing our 
attent ion to sentences from number theory. From these sentences more compli- 
cated sentences can be obtained through the use of sentential  (or proposit ional) 
~onnectives. The sentential  connectives correspond to words or phrases such as 
'and,"  "or , "  "only i f ," " i t  is not the case that , "  " i f  and only i f ,"  or the non- 
connected phrase " i f  . . . then . . . .  " Thus, for example, from "3 is pr ime" and 
"all  odd numbers are pr ime" sentences "if  3 is prime then all odd numbers are 
pr ime" or "3 is prime or it is not the case that  all odd numbers are pr ime" or "al l  
odd numbers are prime only if 3 is pr ime" can be formed through the use of sen- 
tent ial  connectives. Sentential  logic is then concerned with the relationship of 
logical consequence among the sentences that  can be obtained from the atomic 
sentences by means of any number of uses of the logical connectives, independ- 
ently of any meaning that  the atomic sentences may possess. 
The notat ions used for the sentential  logic are numerous. For the sentent ia l  
connective of negation, that  is " i t  is not the case that , "  the symbols ' - '  '~ '  
and %'  are variously used attached to the beginning of the sentence it is intended 
to negate, or a bar is drawn across the top of the sentence it is intended to negate. 
For the sentential  connective of disjunction, that  is, "or , "  logicians, in a rare 
instance of almost complete unanimity,  chose 'Y' in various forms of type al though 
'-t-' can be seen occasionally. For the sentential  connective of conjunction, that  
is, "and , "  the symbols 'h', '&'  and '. '  are all used and in some special contexts 
the simple juxtaposit ion of two sentences uffices as the conjunction of the two 
sentences. For the sentential  connective of implication, that  is, " i f . . .  then . . .  ,"  
a single symbol is used and it  usually is either '~ '  or '--*'. Finally, for the senten- 
tial connective of equivalence, that  is, " if  and only i f ,"  either '=--' or '~-+' is usu- 
ally used. The two place connectives, conjunction, disjunction, implication, and 
equivalence are generally placed between the sentences concerned and the whole 
enclosed in parenthesis to indicate the scope of the connective. Thus if ' P , '  'Q,' 
and 'R' are symbols taken to be atomic sentences then ' ( (~  P ~ Q) & R) '  and 
' (~  (P ~ Q) V ((Q ~ P) -= R)), '  for example, are sentences. 
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In complicated sentences the mult ipl ic i ty of parenthesis can prevent he sen- 
tence from being easily read. There will sometimes occur, therefore, two or more 
different kinds of parenthesis and occasionally dots to replace parenthesis. The 
dot notat ion is usually combined with a convention regarding the strength of 
binding of the connectives, with '~ '  binding most strongly, '&'  and 'V' binding 
less strongly, '~ '  binding even less strongly, and '~  ' binding least strongly. Under 
such a convention, for example, '(Q D P =- R)' would be read as though it were 
'((Q ~ P)  ~- R),' and '(P V Q ~ R)'  would be read as though it were ' ( (P  V Q) ~ R).' 
Dots will indicate the scopes of the connectives of equal strength. For example, 
'(P ~ Q. ~ R)' would be read as '( (P D Q) D R).' As different dot and parenthe-  
sis conventions exist further details are hardly worthwhile here. 
Parenthesis need not occur at all to indicate the scope of connectives if the so- 
called Polish or Lukasiewicz notat ion is used. With this notat ion the connectives 
are attached to the beginning of the juxtaposit ion of the two sentences concerned. 
Thus, for example, 'C' is usually chosen for the implication connective so that  
'CPQ' like ' (P ~ Q)' or '(P ~ Q)' is the sentence which one could write also as 
'if P then Q.' 'N,' 'K,' 'D,' and 'B' are usually chosen for the negation, conjunc- 
tion, disjunction, and equivalence respectively, so that  the two sentences given 
in the paragraph preceding the previous paragraph expressed in this notat ion are 
respectively 'KCNPQR' and 'DNCPQBCQPR.' The fact that  this notat ion re- 
quires no parenthesis can introduce simplifications into any precise language 
which is to discuss the sentences of the sentential  or quantif icational logic as 
purely formal ob iects; but methods do exist for handl ing the parenthesis notat ion 
with almost the same ease as the parenthesis free notat ion.  
The various notat ions that  do exist for the sentential  and, as we will see later, 
also for the quantif icational logics have arisen by historical accident and we can 
see no compelling reason for preferring one to another. 
Once a consistent symbolism has been introduced for the sentential  logic the 
study of the relationship of logical consequence among its sentences can be readily 
carried out. For example a sentence 'R' is a logical consequence of sentences 'P,'  
' (~  Q D ~ P), '  and '(Q ~ R),' or one might say that  the sentence ' (((P & (~.~ Q 
~ P))  & (Q ~ R)) D R)' is logically true or valid. 
The atomic sentences of the sentential  logic are analyzable, that  is, they can 
be broken down into simpler parts, in the quantif icational logic. The quantif ica- 
t ional logic presupposes that  some part icular domain of individuals is to be dis- 
cussed; for example, the domain of all posit ive integers, or of all physical objects, 
or of all events, or of all points in space t ime coordinates, or of all possible sets, 
or of all real numbers, etc., a l though the logic is constructed so as to be independ- 
ent of the domain, that  is, no matter  what domain is under consideration (as long 
as it  has at least one member) the quantif icational logic can be interpreted as 
providing a language for that  domain in the following sense: 
a. Individual  constants (say 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' . . . )  are available to serve as names 
for individuals in the domain under consideration. For a given domain individual 
constants may be chosen with mnemomic ontent;  for example, '1,' '2,' etc. 
b. One place predicate symbols (say 'p,' 'q,' 'r,' . . . )  are available to express 
a property of the individuals in the domain. Thus if 'p' expresses the property of 
being even and 'a' denotes the integer 3 then 'pa' is a sentence xpressing that  3 
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is even; it is the simplest kind of sentence of quantif icational logic and is there- 
fore called atomic. Also two or more place predicate symbols are available to ex- 
press relationships among individuals in the domain and to form further atomic 
sentences. Predicate symbols of a more conventional form such as ' = '  or ' < '  may 
of course be used. 
c. Funct ion symbols of one or more argument places are available for denoting 
functions defined for arguments from the domain of individuals under consider- 
ation and taking values in that  domain. Funct ion symbols, like predicate sym- 
bols or individual constants, may be chosen as one wishes so that  '((1 d- 1) X 2) = 
(3 Jr 1),' for example, if one is interested in the domain of integers, could be ac- 
cepted as a sentence. 
d. The sentential  connectives of sentential  logic are available in quantif ica- 
t ional logic to construct complicated sentences from simpler parts. 
e. Two quantifiers expressing the quanti fying phrases "for at least one indi- 
vidual in the domain" (the existential quantifier) and "for all individuals in the 
domain"  (the universal quantifier) are available in the logic. These two quanti -  
tiers are used, sometimes together with sentential  connectives and predicate sym- 
bols, to express quanti fying phrases such as "for some," "a l l , "  " there exists," 
"none,"  "for at most one," "for at least three,"  "there exists exactly three,"  
etc. Notat ions for the quantifiers vary but a common one is the following: if the 
domain being considered consists of the positive integers then ' (Ex)(Ay) x < y' 
expresses 'at least one integer is smaller than all integers' or ' (Ax)(Ey) x < y' 
expresses 'for every integer there exists an integer which is larger.'  The individual 
variables 'x' and 'y' in these examples are necessary to connect he quantifiers to 
the places in the sentence following them which they govern. 
The terminology used to describe quantif icational logic as well as its symbolism 
varies widely, although the variance is not so large as to make it incomprehensible 
to one who understands one formulation. Individual constants are sometimes 
called individual parameters and predicate symbols of more than one place are 
frequently called relation symbols. The 'E' in the existential quantif ier is fre- 
quently written backwards and is sometimes replaced by 'Z' or 'V' .  The 'A '  in 
the universal quantif ier is frequently omitted or written upside down or replaced 
by 'lI,' or %? The variable (or sometimes variables) attached to a quantif ier may 
sometimes appear as a subscript o a quantif ier ather than being enclosed in 
parenthesis with the quantifier. 
There is one important  formulation of sentential  logic and quantif icational 
ogle which differs radically enough from the above formulation to affect the 
.~ethod of describing the relationship of logical consequence. In the above formu- 
|ations the atomic sentences of senteutial  logic and the predicate and function 
symbols of quantif icational logic are considered to be constants and are sometimes 
called sentential,  predicate, and function constants. However, it is also possible 
to have variables for all these categories just as there are individual variables as 
well as individual constants, although these variables, unlike the individual vari-  
ables, cannot be quantified. They serve rather only to express that  the relation- 
ship of logical consequence can persist between classes of sentences. Thus, for 
example, if 'X '  and ~ Y' are sentential  variables then to assert that  Y is a logical 
consequence of X and (X ~ Y) is to assert his fact not for a part icular sentence 
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X and a particular sentence Y but for all possible sentences X and Y. A blurring 
of the distinction between variable and constant sometimes occurs and can lead 
to confusion. 
Quantificational logic is concerned with the relationship of logical consequence 
among sentences of quantificational logic. Thus, for example, the sentence '(Ez) 
q2 az' is a logical consequence of the sentences '(x) (pl x ~ (y) (Ez) q2 yz)' and 
'(Ex) pl x.' Here the superscripts indicate the number of places of the predicate 
symbols; i.e., the number of variables or individual constants that must be at- 
tached to the symbol. 
How the relationship of logical consequence is described for sentences of quan- 
tificational logic differs very much. However, modern standards of definition in 
logic demand that the description be effective; that is, that given any effectively 
computable sequence of sentences $1, S~, . . . ,  it must be possible to effectively 
compute a sequence Tm , T~, . . .  of sentences which contains all logical conse- 
quences of $1 , S~ , . . . ,  and only logical consequences of $I , S~ , - • • 
The study of what is meant by "effectively compute" has lead to the develop- 
ment of several branches of modern logic that  will be discussed in the third of 
these survey papers. 
Given any effective description of a relationship of logical consequence b tween 
sentences of a logic one can immediately ask if it is complete in some intuitive 
sense that essentially defines the relationship of logical consequence in some man- 
ner which is not necessarily effective. Thus, for example, one might define logical 
consequence as follows: T is a logical consequence of $1, S~, . . . ,  if and only if 
no matter what (nonempty) domain of individuals is chosen, no matter what in- 
dividuals of the domain are assigned to individual constants of the logic, and no 
matter what properties, or functions, or relations between, or individuals of the 
domain are assigned respectively to one place predicate constants, function sym- 
bols, and two or more place predicate constants, whenever $1 , $2 , . - .  are all 
true for this domain under the assignments hen so is T also true. This definition 
makes more precise the intuitive sense of logical consequence expressed when one 
says that T cannot possibly be false for a mathematical structure or model for 
which $1 , $2 , . . .  are all true. Then, given any effective description of logical 
consequence and a definition of logical consequence such as just given one can 
attempt o prove a completeness theorem for the logic; namely, that T will occur 
in the sequence T~ , T2 , • - -, effectively computed from $1 , S~, • •., if and only 
if T is a logical consequence of S~ , S~ , • • • as defined. 
Different sentential and quantificational logics will result from different in- 
tuitive definitions of "logical consequence." For example, the classical ogics in 
which for any sentence 'P,' '(P V -- P)' is logically true differ from the intuition- 
istic logics in which this is not the case. Also the many-valued logics provide dif- 
ferent definitions of "logical consequence." 
3. The books listed at the beginning of this article are of different levels of 
difficulty and presume somewhat different backgrounds. The book by Tarski, for 
example, is the most elementary of them all and only covers sentential logic com- 
pletely. However, it is included here as a suggested supplement or even introduc- 
tion to any of the other books, since it is so well written and leads quickly to an 
understanding of the importance of logic for contemporary mathematics. For 
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example, the discussion on the use of variables of the first chapter, or on the use 
of implication of the second chapter can assist in the understanding of other of 
the books. The greater part  of the book is concerned however with how mathe-  
matical theories are constructed. On the other end of the scale of difficulty from 
Tarski is the book by Church which is not really an introduct ion but rather  a 
very intensive study of sentential  and quantif icational logics ; its completeness is 
not likely to appeal to a novice in logic who does not have an experienced teacher 
to guide him through it. 
Hi lbert and Ackerman is perhaps the most widely known of the books because 
of its venerableness if for no other reason. It  provides a brisk introduct ion to the 
sentential  and quantif icational logics carried as far as a completeness proof. I t  
discusses very l ittle, however, of the problem of translat ing sentences of natural  
languages into sentences of logic. Its most important  fail ing though is in not pro- 
viding str ict enough guidance to the reader for its uses of several different sorts 
of variables. This fail ing probably will not bother those with some background in 
logic but is an obstacle to learning for the novice. Also its proof of completeness 
is too condensed to be intell igible to one not already famil iar with a similar com- 
pleteness proof. 
A better  book than Hi lbert  and Ackerman which covers more material  at almost 
the same brisk pace is that  of Leblanc. As Leblanc is intended as an introduct ion 
to quantif icational logic for the philosophically oriented student without neces- 
sarily a strong mathematics background the reader with purely mathematical  
interest may find that  he wants to skip occasional paragraphs. However, the book 
provides a great deal of addit ional material  that  cannot fail to interest he mathe-  
matical ly oriented: modal and many-valued sentential  logic, intuit ionist ic quanti -  
ficational logic, and alternat ive formalizations of the quantif icational logic in- 
cluding the method of natural  deduction of Gentzen. The book concludes with a 
chapter on the logic of identity,  classes and relations, and a chapter on the com- 
pleteness of the logics and related topics. Because the book discusses a wide range 
of material  in a clear and concise fashion it is to be recommended even to the 
mathemat ica l ly  oriented reader. 
The first two chapters of Quine's book (5) provide undoubtedly the briefest 
rigorous introduct ion to the sentential  and quantif icational logics. Style and 
clarity have not suffered from brevity. Their  purpose is however to introduce 
the remaining chapters of the book so there are no extras provided. Fur ther  the 
difficulties for a novice are unnecessari ly increased by the author 's  at tempt  to 
make the axiomatic foundation for the logic as small as possible. 
The second of Quine's books covers the same ground and more but undertakes 
not only "to convey a precise understanding of the formal concepts of modern 
logic" but also "to develop convenient techniques of formal reasoning." I t  ac- 
complishes both its goals and succeeds as well in giving a brief introduct ion to set 
theory. Since a large part  of the book is concerned with the development of tech- 
niques of formal reasoning anyone interested in such techniques i advised to read 
this book. However, readers interested only in an understanding of what consti- 
tutes modern logic will find the book too detailed and they would be advised to 
read elsewhere. 
The books fall roughly into two classes : those that  are wr i t ten primari ly for a 
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mathematically oriented student and those that are written primarily for a philo- 
sophically oriented student. As already mentioned, Leblanc belongs to the latter 
class but is so written as to be also of interest to mathematically oriented students. 
Quine's (6) also belongs to the second class although is (5) belongs to the first 
class. The remaining two books of Copi and Suppes also belong to the second class. 
Copi contains material of interest o students with mathematical interests but it 
is rather uneven in its presentation. The first seven chapters of the book discuss 
quantification theory primarily as an instrument for the analysis of arguments in 
English, and these chapters are likely to prove to be slow moving for a reader with 
some mathematical maturity. On the other hand the last two chapters are packed 
with material of interest and they may well prove to be too difficult for anyone 
relying only on the previous chapters for background. Copi is distinguished from 
all other books mentioned here, however, by the especially simple proof of com- 
pleteness that it provides, a simplification by Henkin of his proof of completeness. 
Suppes is a richly written book with many interesting sections and examples 
that indicate the wide scope of the author's interests. As a book for the philosoph- 
ically or language oriented student it is preferable to Copi because of the wealth 
of material provided and because it is possibly an easier book to read. There is 
certainly material in this book of mathematical interest--for example, chapters 
on the theory of definition and on the set-theoretical foundations of the axiomatic 
method--but i s treatment of the quantificational logic remains essentially ele- 
mentary. 
Worth  ment ion ing  as supp lementary  reading to any  student of logic is a short 
booklet by  E. W.  Beth, "Semant ic  Enta i lment  and  Formal  Derivability," Nor th -  
Ho l land  (Amsterdam)  1955, wh ich  appears also in Proc. Koninkl. Ned. Akad. 
Wetensehap., Afdeel. Letter. N ieuwe Reeks, Deel  18, No.  13, 1955. In this booklet 
Beth  describes a formal method  of proof for quantification logic wh ich  should 
greatly relieve the frustration of those novices who find it very difficult to formally 
justify what  appears to be an intuitively obvious argument .  
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